THU IMPUTATION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

763

DEPARTMENT OF TORTS.
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,

MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, ESQ.
Assisted by

ALEXANDER DURBIN LAUER.

BENJAMIN H. LOWRY,

CHICAGO, ST. LOUIS AND PITTSBURG

V. SPILKER.'

R. R. Co..
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.

Action for Injuries to Person-Impiuationof Contributory Negligence

-Husband and Wife.
The negligence of a husband in control of the wagon in which he
and his wife were riding, which concurs with the negligence of a railroad
company in causing injury to the wife, cannot be imputed to her, so as
to barher recovery against the railroad company, merely because she was
in the wagon and under his protection.

THn IMPUTATION OV CONTRIBUToRY NEGLIGBNCr.
The word "impute" and its derivatives are used in decisions and
in text-books with reference to
negligence, in a two-fold sense that
is apt to be confusing. They are,
at times, used broadly to convey
the idea that a person is chargeable
with negligence arising from his
own actions (which is an erroneous
use of the word); and again with a
narrower, but more accurate meaning, to denote the fact that one is'
chargeable with the negligence of
another. It is in this latter restricted, but correct, meaning, that these
words will be used in the present
annotation.
It is a general rule of the law of
torts, to be found in all the textbooks on that subject, and in cases
innumerable, that one individual
can be charged with the negligence
of another only when there is some
relation between them that makes
the acts of the latter, in the eye of
the law, to all intents and'purposes
I Reported in 33 N. E. Rep., 280.

(so far, at least, as their civil consequences are concerned), the acts
of the former. Now, the only relations that have this effect are
those of master and servant, principal and agent, and that peculiar
status, as yet without a distinctive
name, but equivalent in its civil
aspects to conspiracy in criminal
law, which makes the act of each
of those engaged in a common
enterprise the act of each of his.
associates. "Before the concurrent
negligence of a third person can be
interposed to shield another whose
neglect of duty has occasioned an
injury to one who was without personal fault, it must appear that the
person injured, and the one whose
negligence contributedto theinjury,
sustained such a relation to each
other, in respect to the matter then
in progress, as that in contemplatioh of law the negligent act of the
third person was, upon the principles of agency, or co-operation in a
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common or joint enterprise, the
act of.the person injured. Until
such agency or identity of interest
or purpose appears, there is no
sound principle upon which it can
be held that one who is himself

blatheless, and is yet injured by
tie concurrent wrong of two persons, shall not have his remedy
against' one who neglected a positive duty which the law enjoined
upon him:" Knightstown zr. Alusgrove, II6Ind., 121 ; S. C., 18 N. R.
ReR-, 452.
Here, then, the liability of one for
, the negligence of another should
stop; and here it does stop, so far
as the imputation of direct or causal
negligence is concerned. But in
the matter.of contributory negligence an attempt has been made to
push this rule to A further limit, or
more accurately, perhaps, to apply
the incidents of the relations above
-mentioned, by a forced and inconsistent analogy, to cases utterly foreign to them, and to which such
incidents were wholly inapplicable,
except by a logical perversion, or a
gratuitous assumption. But oddly
enough, by a curious combination
of circumstances, and one of those
apparently inexplicable freaks of
reasoning to which even the besttrained intellects are at times liable,
four of the ablest of the English
judges accepted this doctrine in the
very first case in which it was urged
upon them, and so set fir to a train
of erratic decisions,some few sparks
-ofwhich are still, at this late day,
fizzing and sputtering.
I. lThe Imputation of Contributory Negligence in Actions for Injuries to the Person.-In most of
the cases under this head an individual, riding in a vehicle driven or
managed by another, has been injured by the concurrent negligence
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of the dviver and a third person;
and the question raised was whether
the contributory negligence of the
driver, which would bar a recovery
by him against the third iarty,
would not also be effectual to
bar a recovery by the passenger.
As has been said, in the first case in
which that question was raised,
Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B., 115,
where the plaintiff was a passenger
in a public omnibus, it was decided
that it would, on the ground that
the passenger became so identified
with the driver that the negligence
of the latter was his negligence.
But this identification, as said
above, can onlr occur in the case
of master and servant and the like;
so that in order to uphold the doctrine it is necessary to hold that
the driver is the servant 6f the passenger. But the indicia of that
relation are wholly wanting in such
a case. The control of the servant
is that which constitutes the master. He who has no control is not
master. And it will hardly be
seriously urged that the passenger
in a public conveyance has any
power to control the driver or.manager thereof. Can a passenger who
wishes to get out at a way statioft
stop an express train at his. pleasure ? or can a person who wishes to
go up-town stop a downward bound
car and make it turn around and go
back? This is absurd, it is true,
but it shows the absurdity of the
rule contended for. Again, if the
negligence of the driver or manager is that of the passenger for the
purposes of contributory negli.gence, what good reason is there
for stopping with this, and not
going on and making the direct
negligence of the driver that of
the passenger, so as to make him
responsible in every case? There is
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a very useful old maxim, which
Mr. Broom omitted, no doubt inadvertently, from his invaluable
work, that runs :" Itis a poor rule
that won't work both ways." And
that is just the fault of the rule
under discussion.
Accordingly, Thorogood v. Bryan,
though followed at first in England;
Armstrong v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., L. R., io Exch., 47;
and in some of the United States,
Lake Shore & Mich. Southern R.
R. v. Miller, 25 Mich., 274; Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 43 Wis.,
513; Otis v. Janesville, 47 Wis.,
422, was so repugnant to the sense
of justice of mankind that, even in
the land of its birth, it was soon
passed by: Rigby v. Hewitt, 5
Exch., 239, and was finally over.ruled in "The Bernina," 12 Prob.
Div., 58; affirmed in Mills v. Armstrong, 13 App. Cas., i,where Lord
HERScHELL dealt with it thus unceremoniously: "In short, as far
as I can see, the identification appears to be effective only to the
extent of enabling another person
whose servants have been guilty of
negligence to defend himself by
the allegation of contributory
negligence on the part of the person injured. But the very question
that had to be determined was,
whether the contributory negligence of the driver of the vehicle
was a defence as against the passenger when suing another wrongdoer. To say that it is a defence
because the passenger is identified
with the driver appears to me to
beg the question, when it is not
suggested that this identification
results from any recognized principles of law, or has any other
effect than to furnish that defence,
the validity of which was .the very
point in issue."
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Even less considerate was the
Supreme Court of the United
States when the same question
arose before it. Mr. Justice FIELD,
in delivering the opinion in Little
v. Hackett, IX6 U. S., 366, said:*
"The truth is, the decision in
Thorogodd v. Bryan rests upon
indefensible grounds. The identification of the passenger with the
negligent driver or the owner, without his co-operation or eniouragement, is a gratuitous assumption.
There is no such identity. The
parties are not in the same position. The owner of a public cdnveyance is a carrier, and-the driver
or the person managing it is his
servant. Neither of them is the
servant of the passenger, and his
asserted identity with them is contradicted by the daily experience
of the world."
And yet, though the reasons assigned for the decision in Thorogood v. Bryan are clearly wrong,
the decision itself seems to have
been correct-on the face of the
pleadings, as Lord BRA5WZLL held
in Mills v. Armstrong, supra, and
on the facts, as the writer believes.
But that is wide of the present discussion, and is only noted here as
a curious example of the infirmity
to which judges are frequently
liable-the inability to assign a
correct reason for a just decision.
(i) It is, therefore, now the
settled law that the negligence of
the driver or manager of the vehicle
of a common carrier cannot be
imputed to a passenger therein so
as to bar his recovery for injuries
due to the negligence of a third
person. This rule applies to passengers on railroad trains: Parshall
v. Minn. & St. L. Ry. Co., 35 Fed.
Rep., 649; Geo. Pac. Ry. Co. v,
Hughes, 87 Ala., 6Io; S. C., 6 So
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Rep., 413; Pitts., Cincin. & St. L.
R R. v. Spencer, 98 fIl., 186; Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Shacklet, loS f11., 364; Chapman
;. New Haven R. R., i9 N. Y.,
•341; Colegrove v. N. Y. & New
Haven and N. Y. & Harlem R. R.
tos., 20 N. Y., -492; Webster v.
Hudson Riv. R. R. Co., 38 N. Y.,
2§0; Flaherty v. N. Pac. Ry. Co.
*-(Minn.), -4o N. W. Rep., I6o;
Transfer Co. v. Kelly, 36 Ohio
St., 86. On street cars: Whelan
v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R.
Co., 38 Fed. Rep., 15; Tompkins v.
Clay St. R. R. Co., 66 Cal., 163;
Louisville, Cinc. & Tex. R. R. Co.
z.'Case, 9 Bush. (Ky.), 728; Cent.
Pass. Ry. Co. v. Kuhn (Ky.), 6 S.
W. Rep., 441; Holzab v. N. 0. &
Carr, R R. Co., 38 La. An., x85; S.
C., 58 Am. Rep., 177; Hunt v. Mo.
R. R. Co., 14 Mo. ApI5., i6o; Bennett v. N.J. R. R. & Transp. Co.,
36 N.J. L., 225; S. C., 13 Am. Rep.,
435; McCallum v. Long I. R. R.
Co., 38 Hun. (N. Y.), 569. On a
.steamboat or other vessel: "The
Bernina," 12 Prob. Div., 58; Cuddy
v. Horn, 46 Mich, 596; Markham v.
Houston Direct Nay. Co., 73 Tex.,
247; N. Y., P. & N. R. R. v. Cooper,
85 Va., 939; S. C., 9 S. E. Rep,
* 321. And in apublicstageorhack:
East Tenn. Ry. Co. v. Markens, 88
Ga., 6o; S. C., 13 S. E. Rep., 855;
Danville, Lanc. & Mich. Turnpike
Co. v. Stewart, 2 Metc. (Ky.), xig;
Becke v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 102
Mo., 544; S. C., 13 S. W. Rep.,
1053. The mere fact that the passenger hires the hack and gives the
driver directions as to the place to
which he wishes to be conveyed,
without exercising any further control over him, does not make the
fornier master of the latter, so as to
be responsible for his negligence:
Little v. Hackett, ix6 U. S., 366.
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(2) When one is riding in a
vehicle of a'quasi-public nature, as
a carriage hired, with a driver, from
a livery stable, the question is a little more difficult. But its solution
depends upon the relation of the
driver to the passenger, and that in
turn depends upon whether the
passenger exercises such control
over the driver as to make him his
servant. If not, the driver is still
the servant of the liveryman, and
his negligence cannot be imputed
to the passenger. The mere fact of
hiring, without more, will not make
the driver the servant of the passenger: Little v. Hackett, ix6 U. S.
366 ; Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Tex. Pac. Ry.,
41 Fed. Rep., 316; Larkin v. Burl.
C. R. & N. R. R. (Iowa), 52 N. W.,

Rep., 480; N. Y.,L. E.& W. R.R.
vi. Steinbrenner, 47 N.J. L.,.161 ; S.
C, 23 A. & E. R. R. Cas., 330;
Randolph v. O'Riordan (Mass.), 29
N. E. Rep., 583. See Callahan v.
Sharp, 27 Hun. (N. Y.), 85, for a
curious perversion of this rule,
which, however, does not shake its
authority.
A strange rule for a long time
prevailed in Pennsylvania, in regard to the liability of the third
person for injuries due to the concurrent negligence of the carrier.
The principle of the identity of the
passenger with the driver and
owner of the vehicle was rejected
as unsatisfactory; but, acting on
the idea that the decision in Thorogood v. Bryan mzest be right, because itwas English, the court held
that it "bettei accords with the
policy of the law to hold the carrier
alone responsible in such circumstances, as an incentive to care and
diligence:" Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa., 151. The court unfortunately' omitted to state the
particular policy of the law with
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of a third person: Metcalf v.
Baker, ii Abb. Pr. (N. S.), 431;
Bennett v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R.,
I6 N. Y. Suppl., 765; Brannen v.
Kkomo, Greentown and Jerome
Gravel Road Co., II1 Ind., 115; S.
C., 17 N. E. Rep., 202; Metrop. St.
Ry. Co. v. Powell kGa.), I6 S. E.
Rep., n8; and it makes no difference in this regard whether he is
riding at the invitation of the driver
or the driver's master: Lapsley v.
Union Pac. R. R., 50 Fed. Rep.,
(3) It is not so easy to decide 172; S. C., aff., R. R. v,. Lapsley,
51 Fed. Rep., 174; Knightstown v.
whether or not the negligence of
Musgrove, I16 Ind., 121; S. C., 18
the -drivir of aritvatevehicle is to
N. E. Rep., 452; State v,. Bost. &
be imputed to the person riding
Maine R. R., 8o Me., 430; S. C., 15
with him: for while it is perfectly
AtI. Rep., 36; P., W. &B. R. R. v.
clear that the passenger in the
Hogeland, 66 Md., 149; "Follman v.
vehicle of a common carrier can
Mankato, 35 Minn., 522; S. C., 15
under ordinary circumstances have
A. & E. Corp. Cas., 258; Noyes v.
no control nor authority over
Boscawen, 64 N. H., 361; Robinson
those who drive or manage it,
v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R., 66 N.
it is equally clear that one who
Y., ii; Dyer v. Erie Ry. Co., 71 N.
rides in a private vehicle may be
master of, or in control of, the Y., 228; Masterson v. N. Y. C. &
H. R. R., 84 N. Y., 247; McCaffrey
driver, and then the negligence
v. Del. & H. Canal Co., 16 N. Y.
of the latter will be justly imputed
to him: Albion v.Hetrick, go Ind., Suppl., 495; Dean v. Pa. R. R., 129
Pa., 514; Nisbet v. Garner, 75 Iowa,
545. Every such case, therefore,
314; S. C., 39 N. W. Rep., 516;,
must be decided on its own circumCahill v. Cin., N. 0. & T. P. Ry.
stances, always keeping in mind
Co., 18 S. W. Rep., 2. Or by perthe cardinal principle that to immission of the other at his own repute the negligence of the driver to
quest: G. H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v.
the passenger-let us call him, for
Kutac, 72 Tex., 643; S. C., ii S.
the sake of convenience-the latter
See, however,
W. Rep., 127.
must have either such actual control of, or right to control, the lat- Smith v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.,
38 Hun. (N. Y.), 33, which holds
ter, as to constitute the relation of
that in the latter instance a somemaster and servant between them
what greater degree of care is refor the time being.
quired of the passenger, and that it
In accordance with this, it is the
general rule that when one is rid- is his duty, if he finds that the
driver is driving carelessly, to reing gratuitously in a vehicle driven
monstrate with him.
by another, over whom he has no
Against this consensus of opinion,
control, the negligence of the
Massachusetts, Texas, Wisconsin
driver cannot be imputed to the
and. Iowa still hold out; the first
passenger in an action by the latter
three on the authority of the rule
or injuries due to the negligence
which this decision accorded; but
this case was blindly followed for
years: P. & R. R. R. v. Boyer, 97
Pa., 91; Borough of Carlisle v.
Brisbane, i13 Pa., 544, until 'at
last the absurdity of it became
manifest, and the court stepped
into line with the rest of the United
States, by adopting the general
Hackett, and "The
rule of Little v,.
Bernina," sufira; Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa., 363; S. C. 21 AtI. Rep.,
3r.
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/in Thorogood v. Bryank ; Allyn v.
#B., & Alb. R. R., 105 Mass., 77
(but see Randolph v. O'Riordan
(Mis.), 29 N. E. Rep., 583); Johnson v. R. R. (Tex.), 21 S. W. Re4p.,
274" (but see R. R. v. Moore, 59
Tex., "64, and R. R. - v. Kutac, 72
Tei , 643); Prideaux v. Mineral
Point, 43 Wis., 513; Otis v. Janesville, 47 Wis., 422; and
Iowa,

senger himiself, and wide of the
qpestion under discussion.
(4) On the point whether the
negligence of a husband can be imputed to his wife there is a hopelesi conflict of opinion. To the
effect that it will be so imputed,
because the husband is to be regarded as the aghnt of the wife, are

*through a misapprehension pecu-

bull, 2 McCra (U. S.), 314; Peck
v. N. Y., N. H. & Hartf. R. R., 50
Conn., 379; Joliet v. Seward, 86
Ill., 402; Yahn v. Ottumwa, 6o
Iowa, 429; G. C. & S. F. Ry. Co.
v. Greenlee, 62 Tex., 344; Carlisle
v. Sheldon, 38 Vt., 440. But this
rests upon a misapprehension of
the relation between husband and
wife. It is the husband who, in
the eye of the law, controls the
wife, not the wife the-husband;
and the instances in real life that
contradict this old doctrine are not
yet so numerous that the courts
can justly take judicial notice of
them. If the relation of master
and s'ervant exists between them
in any sense, the husband is the
master and the wife the servant
not vice versa, as the rule above
statedwould have it. But the contributory negligence of the master
cannot be imputed to the servant:
Mills v. Armstrong, 13 App. Cas.,
z; "The Bernina," 12 Prob. Div.,
58. The fallacy of the rule that
would impute the negligence of the
husband to the wife is thus very
pungently exposed in Louisville,
N. A. & C. Ry. v. Creek (Ind.), 29
N. B. Rep., 481: "A husband and
wife may undoubtedly sustain such
relations to each other in a given
case that the negligence of one
will be imputed to the other. The
mere existence of the marital relation, however, will not have that
effect. In our opinion there would

liar to itself: Payne v. C. R., I. &
P. R. R., 39 Iowa, 523; Stafford v.
Oskaloosa, 57 Iowa, 748; Slater v.
Burl., C. L & N..Ry. Co. (Iowa),
32 N. W. Rep., 264. For, unhappily for the correctness of the doctrine, the first of the Iowa cases in

which the negligence of the driver
'was imputed to the passenger:

Payne v. R. R. Co., sup ra, was deciddd expressly on the authority of
Artz v. R. R., 34 Iowa, 153, in
which case the plaintiff himself was

driving at the time of theaccident,
and which, therefore, could not be

'7-.a proper criterion for the case then
in hand.
But though the negligence of the
driver cannot be imputed to the
passenger, the latter is nevertheless charged with the duty of see-

ing that the driver is competent;
or, at least, that there is no good
reason to suspect him of incompetency: Knightstown v. Musgrove, 116 Ind., 121, S. C., 18 N.
/ . Rep,, 452; Noyes v. Boscawen,

64 N. H., 36x.

This is correct, for

in the case of a common carrier
that duty rests on the carrier, and
the passenger is accordingly relieved of it; but when accepting a
ride with a person who is not
charged with any such duty toward him, he ought, in common
justice, to be held to take it on himself. But this, of course, if not
done, is negligence in the pas-

the following: Huntoon v. Trum-
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be no more reason or justice in a
rule that would, in cases of this
character, inflict upon a wife the
consequences of her husband's
negligence, solely and alone because of that relationship, than to
hold her accountable at the bar of
eternal justice for his sins because
shewas his wife." On everyground
it seems the better and more equitable rule to hold that the negligence of the husband cannot be
imputed to the wife; and it is upheld by a very respectable list of
authorities: Sheffield v. Central
Union Tel.-Co., 36 Fed. Rep., 164;
Shaw v. Craft, 37 Fed. Rep., 317;
Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Creek
(Ind.), 29 N. E. Rep., 481; Chic.,
St. L. & Pitts. R. R. v. Spilker
(the principal case) (Ind.), 33 N.
E. Rep., 280; Davis v. Guarnieri
(Ohio), 15 N. -E. Rep., 350; Platz
v. Cohoes, 24 Hun. (N. Y.), ioi;
S. C. aff., 89 N. Y., 219; Hoag. v.

N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. R. (N. Y.),.
18 N. E. Rep., 648; S. C., iii N.
Y., i99.

In California the negligence of
the husband is imputed to the wife,.
or, rather, bars her recovery, for a
reason peculiar to that State. By
the California Code the damages
recovered in such a case would become the joint pr6perty of the husband and wife, and the Court holds
that it would be inequitable for
him thus to share in the proceeds
of his own wrong: McFadden v. R.
R., 78 Cal., 464 ; S. C., 25 Pac. Rep.,
681. This rule would seem to be
fully as unjust to the innocent wife
as the other rule would be to the
wrongdoer; and one would think
that an innocent person was entitled to protection before a wrongdoer. But whether right or wrong,
the California decision rests on
more aefensible ground than those

which would make the husband the
agent of the wife.
(5) As to the case of a child riding with a parent, who is driving,
it was ruled in Kyne v. Wilm. &
N. R. R. (Del.), 14 At. Rep., 922,
that the negligence of the latter
was to be imputed to the former;
but this doctrine was rejected in
Griffith v. B. & 0. R. R., 44 Fed.
Rep., 574, and St. Clair St. Ry. Co.
v. Badie, 43 Ohio St., 91. This
latter ruling is more consonant
with principle, as will be shown
later.
(6) As has been said above, the
negligende of the master cannot be
imputed to a servant so as to bar a
recovery by the latter against a
wrongdoer: "The Bernina,"12 Prob.
Div., 58; aff., Mills v. Armstrong,
13 App. Cas., i. Nor can the negligence of one servant be imputed
to his co-servant, who has no control or authority over him: Cray
v. P. & R. R. R., 23 Blatchf. (U.S.),
2631, Perry v. Lansing, 17. Hun.
(N. Y.), 34; Seaman v. Kdehler,
46 Hun. (N. Y.), 681; S. C. aff., 25
N. E. Rep., 353; Elyton Land.Co.
v. Mingea, 89 Ala., 521; S. C., 7
So. Rep., 666.
(7) There remains the question
whether or not the negligence of a driver is to be imputed to those
engaged with him in a common
enterprise. On principle it should
be imputed; and the only question
that can be raised is as to what
will constitute a common enterprise. One instance is the case of
a picnic party, driven by one of
their number; and in guch a case
the driver's negligence would very
properly be imputed to the others :
See Beck v. East River Ferry Co., 6
Robt. (N. Y.), 82. This question,
however, depending as it does upon
the circumstances of each case, is
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always a question of.fact for the
jury, not one of law for the Court.
The results of 'a disregard of this
risle. are very plainly shown in'
Callahan v. Sharp, 27 Hun. (N. Y.),
'8, .where it was gravely decided.
that four children, whom their
rothr was taking with her to a

funeral, weie engaged in a common
enterprise with her, and that her

negligence was therefore imputable to them.
(8) But perhaps the most absurd
length to which it has been sought
to push this doctrine of the impu-,
tation of contributory negligence is
to be found in a case recently decided in New York. Some school
children had amused themselves
during recess, without their teacher's knowledge, by teasing a ram
belonging to the defendant, and
had so ruiled his temper that when
the teacher appeared on the scene
he forthwith butted her, much, no
doubt, to the delight of those
naughty children; and it was
solemnly argued that the negligence of the children in teasing
the ram, which would have barred
their recovery if they had got in
his way, should be imputed to the
teacher. As a matter of course the
Court refused to entertain so preposterous a claim, and dismissed it
with ,the simple remark that they

(9) It is a very interesting, and
as yet rather unsettled, question
whether the contributory negligence of a parent or custodian -can
be imputed to a child, especially if
it be of tender years, and so not
chargeable with any negligence of
its own, so as to bar its recovery
for an injury caused by the negli-

gence of a third person? The solution would seem-very simple.
Here there cannot be that control

or authority which, as has been
shown, is necessary to create a
basis for the imputation of contributory negligence. And yet the
courts of two of the United States
most noted for the general accuracy of their judicial decisions,
New York and Massachusetts, have
adopted the rule that the child cannot recover if the negligence of
the parent contributed to its injury,
and cling to it with a tenacity
worthy of a betier cause.
The
case on which this erroneous
doctrine is founded is Hartfield
v. Roper, 21 Wend., 615, where
it is thus supported: "An infant is not suijuris. He belongs
to another, to whom discretion in
the care of his person is exclusively
confided. That person is keeper
and agent for this purpose; and in
respect to third persons, his act
must be deemed that of the infant;
had been cited to no case to sup- his neglect, the infant's neglect."
port it: Kinmouth v. McDougall, But the doctrine that a defenceless
ig N. Y. Suppl., 771.
infant is to be barred from recovery
It must be always borne in mind, against a wrongdoer and the latter
however, that though the negli- go scot free, simply because' the
gence of a driver may not be im- natural protector ofthe infant failed
puted to the passenger, the latter in his duty to it, surely needs no
may himself be guilty of such neg- refutation. It is " visiting the sins
ligence as will bar his recovery: 'of the fathers upon the children to
Crescent v. Anderson, 114 Pa., 643; an extent not contemplated in the
Brickell v. R. R., 120 N. Y., Decalogue, or in the more imper290; S. C., 24 N.
. Rep., 449; fect digests of human law :" LanFlagg v. R. R., 55 N. W. Rep., 444. nen v. Albany Gas Light Co., 46
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19 AUt. Rep., 1102, in a long and
Barb. (N. Y.), 264; (this, too, in
the State where the doctrine had careful opinion. "This doctrine,"
its birth, and where it still reigns he says, "of the imputability of
the misfeasance of the keeper of a
supreme); it is opposed "to every
principle of reason and justice:"
child to the child itaelf is deemed
Whirley v. Whiteman, i Head.
to be a pure interpolation into the
law; for, until the case under criti(Tenn.), 6io, and "is repulsive to
our natural instincts, and repug- cism (Hartfield v. Roper), it was
nant to the condition of that class absolutely unknown, nor is it susof persons who have to maintain
tained by legal analogies. Infants
have always been the particular oblife by daily toil :" Kay v. Pa. R. R.,
65 Pa., 269. Yet in spite of this jects of the favor and protection of
it has been adoptd in New York, the law. In the language of an ancient authority this doctrine is thus
as we have seen (though it does not
seem to have risen squarely for de- expresssed: 'The common princicision since Hartfield v. Roper, but ple is, that an infant, in all things
rather to have been acquiesced in which sound in his benefit; shall
by counsel) ; in Massachusetts : have favor and preferment in law as
Holly v. Boston Gas Light Co., 8' wellas anotherman, butshallnotbe
Gray (74 Mass.), 123; Callahan v. prejudicedby anythingto his disadBean, 9 Allen (91 Mass.), 4oi ; Mes- vantage .' 9 Vin. Abr., 374. And it
senger v. Dennie, 137 Mass., 197; in would appear to be plain that
Maine: Leslie v. Lewiston, 62 Me., nothing could be more to the.pre468; in Minnesota: Fitzgerald v. judice of an infant than to convert,
by construction of law, the connecSt. P., Minn. & Manitoba R. R.,
29 Minn., 336; Reed v. Ry., 27 N. tion betweeft himself and his cusW. Rep., 77, and in Indiana, todian into an agency to which the
though here it seems to rest on a harsh rule of respondeat supierior
mistake of authority very similar should be applicable. The answerableness of the principal for the
to that previously noted in Iowa:
authorized acts of his agent is not
R. R. V.Vining, 27 Ind., 513; R. R.
v. Huffman, 28 Ind., 287; Hatha- so much the dictate of natural jusway v. R. R., 46 Ind., 25. It seems tice as of public policy, and has
also to be the rule still in England, arisen, with some propriet , from
*as no case appeais yet to have ex- the circumstances that the creation
pressly overruled Waite v. N. E. of the agency is a voluntary act,
R. R., El. Bl. & El., 719, and Sin- and that it can be controlled and
gleton v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co.,
ended at the will of its' creator.
7 C. B. N. 8., 287; although, as But in the relationship between
these cases rest on Thorogood v. the infant and its keeper all these
Bryan, they may perhaps be con- decisive characteristics are wholly
wanting. The law imposes the
sidered to fall with it.
The very slender basis of per- keeper upon the child, who, of
verted reasoning on which this course, can neither control nor redoctrine rests is completely refuted move him; and the injustice, thereand its fallacies clearly exposed by fore, of making the latter responChief Justice BEASLEY, of NewJer- sible in any-measure whatever for
sey, in Newman v. Phillipsburgh
the torts of the former would seem
Horse Car Co., 52 N.J. L., 446 ;:S. C. to be quite evident. . . . The
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conversion, of the infant, who is
entirely free from fault, into a
wrongdoer, by imputation, is a
logical contrivance uncongenial
'with the spirit of jurisprudence.
Nor is it to be overlooked
. that the theory here repudiated, if
it should be adopted, would go the
length of making an infant in its
nurse's arms answerable for all the
- Inegligences of such nurse while
thus employed in its service. Uvery
person so damaged by the careless
custodian would be entitled to his
action against the infant. If the
neglect of the guardian is to be regarded as the neglect of the infant,
as was asserted in the New York
decision, it would, from logical
necessity, follow that the infant
must indemnify those who should
be harmed by such neglect. That
such a doctrine has never prevailed
is conclusively shown by the fact
that in the reports there is no indication that such a suit has ever
* been brought."
If any further argument is
needed to support the Chief Justice's opinion, and prove the utter
fallacy of the doctrine of Hartfield
v. Roper, it is abundantly supplied
by the vast weight of authority
against the latter: Goyt. St. R. R.
Co. v. Hanlon, 53 Ala., 70; Pratt
Coal & Iron Co. v. Brawley, 83
Ala.,371; Daley v. Norwich &
Worcester R. R. Co., 26 Conn.,
591; Ferguson 'v. Columbus &
Rome R. R., 77 Ga., 102; Chic.
City Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, 33 Ill.
-App., 450; S. C., 24 N. E. Rep.,
419; S. C. aff., 27 N. E. Rep., 899;
Wymore v. Mahaska Co., 78 Iowa,
,396; Westerfield v. Levis, 43 14a.
An., 63; S. C., 9 So. Rep., 52; Balt.
City Pass. Ry. Co. v. McDonnell,
43 Ivid., 534; Shippy v. Au Sable,
85 Mich., 280; S. C., 48 N. W.

Rep., 584; Westbrook v. Mobile &
OhioR. R., 66 Miss., 56o; S. C., 6
So. Rep., 321; Winters. v. Kansas
City Cable Ry. Co., 99 Mo., 5o;
S. C., 12 S. W. Rep., 652; Huff v.
Ames, 16 Neb., 139; Bisaillon v.
Blood (N. H.), i5 At. Rep., 147;
B. & 0. R. R. v. Snyder, x8 Ohio
St., 399; C. C. C. & I. R. R. v.
Manson, 30 Ohio St., 451; Smith
v. O'Connor,.48 Pa., 218; Pitts.,
Allegheny & Man. Pass. Ry. Co.
v. Caldwell, 74 PA., 421; Erie Pass.
Ry. Co. v. Schuster, 113 Pa., 412;
G. H. & H. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 59
Tex., 64; Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt.,
213; Norfolk & Petersburgh R. R.
v. Ormsby, 27 Gratt. (Va.), 455;
Norfolk & Western R. R. v. Groseclose (Va.), 13 S. B. Rep., 454.
A few cases have attempted to
draw a distinction between passive
and active negligence of the parent,
as between merely suffering the
child to go into a place of danger
and ordering it to go: Stillson v.
R. R., 67 Mo., 671; but the distinction seems very far-fetched. If
the negligence of the parent is to
be imputed at all, it can certainly
make no difference as to its kind,
and, as we have seen, there is no
valid reason for imputing it at all.
The cases in which this distinction
has been asserted have most of
them been cases where, with equal
or better reason, the negligence of
the parent might have been held
to be the proximate cause of the
injury, as where the parent assisted
or compelled the child to jump
from a moving train: Morrison v.
Erie Ry. Co., 56 N. Y., 302; R. R.
v. Stratton, 78 Ill., 88.
But though the negligence of the
parent ought not to be imputed to
a child suing for its own benefit, it
should be -so imputed in an action
brought by the administrator of
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the child on behalf of the next of relations to the former, the others
kin : Schierhold v. North -Beach &
could be tossed aside.
But, as has been conclusively
Mission R. R., 40 Cal., 447; Toledo,
Wabash & West. Ry. Co. v. Grable,
shown by the ablest judges over
88 Ill., 441; Chic. & N. W. Ry. Co.
and over again, not only is there
v. Schumilowsky, 8 Ill.
App., 613;
no real analogy, but even if there
Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & Chic. Ry. were its effects could not be restricted in the manner claimed upon
Co. v. Vining, 27 Ind., 513; Wright
any principle of law or justice. If
v. R. R., 85 Mass., 2b3; Kunz v.
the analogy exists for one purpose
Troy (N. Y.), Io N. E. Rep., 442;
it exists for all others; if it is effecEwen v. Chic. & N. AV. Ry. Co.,
tual to impute contributory negli38 Wis., 613. See Contra,Wymore
gence, it must also be effectual to
v. Mlahaska Co., 78 Iowa, 396; S. C.,
impute direct negligence. And yet
43 N. W. Rep., 264; Norfolk & W.
in not one of the relations discussed
R. R. v. Groseclose (Va.), 13 S. E.
in this annotation has this ever
Rep., 454; because the negligent
parent is usually the next of kin,
been attempted, or even suggested,
and as he would be barred by his except to reprobate the idea. This
negligence from recovering dam- fact of itself is a tacit confession
ages on his own behalf from the of the inherent weakness of the
wrongdoer: Evansville & Craw- position of those who would thus
impute contributory negligence,
fordsville R. R. Co. v. Wolf, 59
Ind., 89; Albertson v. Keokuk & for it proves that they do not dare
Des Moines R. R., 48 Iowa, 292;
to carry out their theory to its 16gical and legitimate consequences;,
Koons v. St. L. & Iron Mountain
R. R., 65 Mo., 592; Bellefontaine. and it causes us to marvel all the
R. R. v. Snyder, 24 Ohio St., 670;
more at the blind, unreasoning
tenacity with which they still cling
Glassey vz. R. R., 57 Pa., 172; P.
to a doctrine that, in the language
& R. R. R. v. Long, 75 Pa., 257;
Williams v. T. & P. R. R., 6o Tex.,
of Justice CLARK, in Dean v. Pa.
R. R., 129 Pa., 514, is consonant
205, It would, therefore, be inequitable to allow him to gain any
neither "with common sense, common honesty, nor public policy."
advantage from his own negligence
in this indirect way.
It would be amusing, if it were
If the preceding discussion has not at the same time rather disheartening, to note the absurdly
served its purpose, it will be clear
that the fundamental errors in the irreconcilable conflict with themdoctrine which would inipute the selves into which the courts of
some of the States have fallen
contributory negligence of driver
to passenger, and of parent to 'through their disregard of the
child, have been, in the first place,
fundamental principle that there
the purely gratuitous assumption
can be no service or agency unless
that in the relations mentioned
the servant or agent be subject to
there was an analogy to the relation
the authority and control of the
of master and servant, or principal
master or principal. In Iowa, a
passenger in a private carriage is
and agent, and, in the second
place, the equally gratuitous as- chargeable with the negligence of
sumption that, having attached
the driver: Payne v. R. R., 39
Iowa, 523; a wife with that of her
one of the incidents of the latter
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husband: Yahn v. Ottumwa, 6o
Iowa, 429; but a child is not charge,able with that of his parents : Wysore v. Mahaska Co., 78 Iowa, 398;
S. C., 43N. W. Rep., 264; while in
New York the conditions are re-,
-versed, and the child is chargeable
with the parent's negligence: Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend., 615; but
the passenger is not affected by
that of the driver: Robinson v. R.
R., 66 N. Y., ii; nor the wife by
that of her husband: Hoag v. R.
R., iii N. Y., 199. In Connecticut
and Vermont the negligence of the
husband is imputed to the wife:
Peck v. R. R., So Conn., 379; Carlisle v. Sheldon, 38 Vt., 44o; but
that of the parent is not imputed
to the child: Daley v. R. R., 26
Conn., 59I; Robinson v. Cone., 22
Vt., 213; while the reverse of each
holds good in Indiana: R. R. v.
Spilker (the principal 'case), 33 N.
E. Rep., 280; Hathaway v. R. R.,
46 nd., 25. In Texas the confusion
seems hopeless. In G. H. & H.
Ry. Co. v. Moore, 59 Tex., 64, it
vas held that the negligence of the
father was not to be imputed to the
child; in G. C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Greenlee, 62 Tex., 344, it was ruled
that the husband was the agent of
the wife, and that his negligence
shouldbe imputed to her; in R. R.
v. Kutac, 72 Tex., 643, the negligence of the driver of a wagon was
held not imputable to those who
had requested permission to ride
in it; and yet, in the very latest
ease on the general subject in that
State, Johnson v. R. R. (Tex.), 21
S. W. Rep., 274, it was held that a
blind man, riding with his father,
entrusted his safety to him, i -ade
him hig agent, and was barred by
his negligence. All this confusion
for want of a firm grasp of basic
principles! In bringing order out

of this chaos these alone can be
the moulding force, and these alone
can be the clue to escape from this
labyrinth of contradiction.
This, then, is the result of the
investigation, adopting in every
instance the conclusions of the
best-considered .cases, and those
which are founded more firmly on
principle, and developed with more
logical precision: In no case is the
contributory negligence of one person to be imputed to another so as
to bar his recoVery for an injury
caused by the wrong of a third
person, unless the two former stand
to each other in the relation of
either master and servant, or principal and agent; or else are engaged
in the prosecution of some common
enterprise. As a necessary conse-"
quence of this, the negligence of
the driver or manager of the vehicle
of a common carrier, such as a
railroad or horse car, cable, or electric car, steamboat or other vessel,
or apublic omnibus, stage or hack,
is never to -be imputed to the passengers therein; the negligence of
the driver of a quasi-public vehicle,
such as a livery coach or hack, is
not to be imputed unless the passenger has clearly shown by his
acts that he has assumed the position of master of the driver for the
time being; the negligence of the
driver of a private vehicle is not to
be imputed to the passenger, nor
that of a husband to his wife, unless there is some control or authority exercised by, or belonging to,
the latter in either case; and in
spite of the contrary doctrine recognized by some usually accurate
courts, in no case whatever is the
negligence of a-parent to be imputed to a child, suing for its own
benefit, though it is to be so imputed when the action is brought

IGNORANCE OF AN OWNER'S TITLE.
by the administrator for the benefit
of the next of kinII. Impulation of Contributory
Vegligence in Resiect to Injuries
to Proberty.-If the contributory
negligence is that of the plaintiff's
servanlt, it will, of course, be imputed to the plaintiff: Toledo &
Wabash Ry. Co. v. Goddard, 25
Ind., 185; Puterbaugh v. Reasor, 9
Ohio St., 484 ; and if the property
is injured through the contributory
negligence of a borrower without
hire, the lender cannot recover
against a third person: Forks Twp.
v. King, 84 Pa., 230. (But this is
more than doubtful, as it was decided while the erratic rule of
Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler was still
in force in Pennsylvania.)
When goods in the possession of
a common carrier are damaged by
the concurrent negligence of the
carrier and a third person, it has
been held in England that the
owner could recover against thelatter: "The Milan," I Lush. Adm.,
388; S. C., 5 L. T. N. S., 59o; but
a contrary rule was announced in
Pennsylvania, in Simpson v. Hand,
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6 Wh., 3iI; and the question may
now be considered as satisfactorily
settled by the decision in Arctic
Fire Ins. Co. v. Austin, 69 N. Y.,
470, where it was held that as the
possession of the carrier is that of
the owner of the freight, and whatever is done by the former in the
course of his service and bailment
is done by him as the agent and
representative of the latter, any
wrongful act of the carrier which
contributes to the injury of the
goods will bar the owner from his
action against a third party, and
will confine him. to his remedy
against the carrier.
[For an interesting discussion
and statement of the general principles applicable to the subject
of this annotation see an annotation on kindred lines by AEx.
DURBIN LAUER, Esq., in AMERIcAN LAW REGISTER AND REvIpw,
for April, 1893, Vol. XxxII, p. 374,
entitled, "Imputation of Negligence to Passenger, How Affecting
his Right of Action Against Joint
Wrong-Doers."]
R. D. S.

SUPREME COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA.
When Ignoranceof an Owner's Title is a Defense to an Action of Trover
and Conversion.
Bodmer, a stock broker in Wilkesbarre, and defendants, stockbrokers
in Philadelphia, were correspondents. Defendants executed orders for
Bodmer for the purchase and sale of stocks on the Philadelphia and New
York Stock Exchanges, dividing the commissions when the rules did not
forbid. There was a private wire between the two offices, which was used
in sending quotations and orders. Plaintiff employed Bodmer to purl I53 Pa., 245.

CONVERSION BY AGENTS
chase through defendants some stock and bonds which were paid for by
plaintiff's check to defendants, and the stock and bonds were sent to
Wilkesbarre. Subsequently plaintiff gave a similar order to Bodmer for
other securities, who transmitted it to defendants, sending also the first
'securities, to which were attached blank transfers signed by the plaintiff.
This collateral was to be held by defendants to secure part of the purchase money on the new order. Defendants credited it in a general
account with Bodmer. Before the purchaSe-money had been fully paid
defendants failed, and the securities were subsequently solct by them or
tlieir receiver. Held, in an action for a wrongful conversion of the
securities, that there was evidence to submit to the jury to determine
whether defendants had sufficient notice of the real ownership of the
securities.

Opinion of the Court by
JJ, dissent.

DEAN, J.

WILLIAMS

and

MITCHELL,

C ONVERSION BY AGENTS AND SERVANTS.
In the principal case the Supreme
his customer's securities in his own
Court, through the opinion of one name. It is, perhaps, beyond the
of the majority, discusses the appli- scope of an annotation to criticise
cation of the rule that where the the ruling of an appellate court,
owner of stock, by a power of at- but the dissenting opinion of Mr.
torney signed in blank, has con- Justice MITcHELL is entitled 'to
ferred upon another all the indicia
very careful consideration.
of ownership, he is estopped from
Wood's Appeal, 92 Pa., 379, cerassirting his title to it as against a
tainly appears to rule the case. An
third person, who has in good faith
executor pledged with his broker
purchased it for value from the ap- for an individual debt certificates
parent owner. In reaching the of stock belonging to the estate,
conclusion that this rule had no
accompanied by a blank bill of sale
application to the facts of the case .and power of attorney signed by
before the Court, but little space is him as acting executor. The brodevoted to the consideration of kers in turn pledged the stock to
what is sufficient notice of owner- one who advanced money to them
ship, or rather, what circumstances
in the belief that they were the real
are sufficient to put a reasonable
owners. The remaining executors
man on inquiry as to the real
filed a bill in equity to recover it.
ownership, to take a case out of the
It was held that there could be no
scope of the rule.
recovery of the stock until the adThe only circumstance evident
vances made thereon were paid.
from the report of the case upon
"The fact that the legal title to the
which the Court relies to suitain stock," said the Court, "was known
its position that the defendant was
to have previously been in the exput upon inquiry, was some slight
ecutor, and that the title of the
evidence that the defendant knew holder appeared on its face to have
that plaintiff's broker operated with
been derived from him in his rep-
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resentative capacity, does not raise
a suspicion or put a purchaser on
inquiry, for the reason that it is
the executor's primary duty to dispose of the assets and settle the
estate."
In his dissentingopinion (153 Pa.,
153) Mr. Justice MirTCH-Lr, points
out that a certificate of stock
with a power of attorney to
transfer duly executed, but in blank
as to date and name of transferee,
is in the position of merchandise
prepared for market; that this is
the usual way sales and transfers of
stock are niade, and the presumable
intent of executing the power to
transfer is to put the holder in a
position to complete a sale by delivery of the certificate and a transfer
of the stock. The business of a
stockbroker is to buy and sell
stock, and when a certificate and
power to transfer are put .into a
broker's hands the situation is exactly analogous to that of goods of
merchandise of any kind prepared
for market, and put into the hands
of a dealer in that particular
article.
Comparing Wood's Appeal with
the principal case, it certainly
seems that if the fact that the certificates showed -the title to have
been in an executor was not
enough to put the purchaser on
inquiry, as was held in Wood's Appeal, then a fortiori the mere fact
that the certificate was in the name
of a customer of a broker forwhom
the stocks had previously been
bought, would not have that effect.
It is to be remembered that in the
principal -case the stock was purchased by the defendants in the
first instance for the plaintiff
through his broker, and it was only
after the lapse of many months
that the identical certificates again

came into the hands of the defendants, with whom they were deposited as collateral security, as the
defendants believed, for an individual transaction of the plaintiffs
broker.
Leiper's App., io8 Pa., 377; Ellis' App., 8 W. N. C., 538 ; Foster
v. Berg, io4 Pa., 324, are not in
point because in these cases the
indicia of ownership were defective
on their face, or there was positive
notice of the limitation on the
vendor's title. Such, also, was the
case of Sheffield v. Bank, L. R., 13
Ap., 333.
See Fisher v. Brown, 1o4 Mass.,
259; Bank v. Cady, L. R., 15 Ap.,
267; Leavitt v. Fisher, 4 Duer (N.
Y.), x; Fatman v. Lobach, i Duer
(N. Y.), 354; Burton's Ap., 93 Pa.,
214; Zulick v. Markhani, 6 Daly,
129; Dickinson v. Dudley, 17 Hun,,
569; Wood v. Hays, 15 Gray, 375;
Covell v. Loud, 135 Mass., 41.
Closely allied to the class of
cases of which Wood's Appeal may
be regarded as the type, are the
cases discussing how far an innocent dealing with personal property
through an apparent owner who'is
in fact a tort feasor, will operate as
a defense to an action of trover and,
conversion at the suit of the real
owner.
The proposition that persons deal
with property in chattels or exercise
dominion over them at their peril,
is so well established as to have
the force of a maxim in modem
law: 2 Black's Com., 449; per Lord.
ErjENBOROUGH,
McCombie v.
Davis, 6 East., 548; Minnie v.
Blake, 6 E. & B., 85i; Burrows v.
Bane, 5 H. & N., 3TO; Anon.. 12
Mod., 591; Lee v. Bayes, 609; Benjamin v. Andrews, 5 C. B. N. S.,
99; Hoffman'v. Carow, 22 Wend.,
277; Fawcett v. Osborn, 32 Ill.,

CONVERSION BY AGENTS
And any exception to this
411.
,Tale caii be referred to: (I) Where
the owner has placed the complete
.control of the property in another
- who .rpesit contrary to the owner's
'rightq: (2) The rules of the law
mierchant respecting negotiable inr strutients; (3) The rules and customs prevailing in the case of sales
in ruarket overt or the equivalent
thereof.
In certain cases, however, where
the question is as to the liability of
agents and servants acting innocently under the authority of a
principal whose possession is tortious, there is a well-defined qualification to the severe principle
stated above Clerk & Lindsell
on Torts, p. ;70; Hollins V. Fow._,ler;L. R. H. L., 767; Hollins v,.
Fowler, L. R., 7 Q. B., 63o; Cochran v. Rymill, 40 L. T. N. S.,
744; Sheridan v. New Quay Co.,
4 C. B. N. S., 760; Greenaway v.
Fisher, i C. & P., -19o; Alexander
v. Southey, 5 B. & Ald., 247.
, Generally the capacity in which
a defendant commits a wrong tan
never enter as an element in the
determination of his liability;
therefore, an agent in possession
who sells or otherwise deals with
property as an owner can never
justify under the authority of his
principal vwho happens to be without title. But there are circumstances where, from the nature of
the agent's act and the character.of
hip possession, the law absolves
him from liability, although the
rights of the real owner are thereby
infringed. Thus a servant in charge
of goods upon his master's premises
does not ordinarily have such possession as would render him liable
for a refusal to deliver at the request of the owner of whose rights
he is ignorant: Alexander v. Southey, 5 B. & Ald., 247.

The development of this branch
of the law is rather curious. It was
originally held that an agint or
servant could under no circumstances be held liable in trover for
an act authorized by a principal or
master which infringed upon the
rights of the real owner. Thus in

Mires v. Solebay,

2

Mod.,

242,

the

Court is reported to have said
that "The action would not'lie
against the servant, for it being in
obedience tohis master's command,
though he had "notitle, yet he shall
be excused. And this rule, Justice
SCROGGS said, would extend to all
cases where the master's command
was not to do an apparent wrong,
for if the master's case depended
upon a title, be it true or not, it is
enough to excuse the servant; for
it would be a mischievous thing if
the servant upon all occasions must
be satisfied with his master's title
and right before he obeys his commands, and it is very requisite that
an action would lie against him for
what he doth in obedience to the
master:" I Roll of Abr., 6; r Coin.
Dig., 221 F.; Wyne & Rider, 2
Mod., 67; 4 Bacon's Abr., 258; Lee
v. Bayes, I8 C. B., 6o6; Mount v.
Derick, 5 Hill, 455. See Chittyon
Pleading, 72, citing 2 Strange, 813.
Compare Berry v. Vantries, 12 Sar.
& Rawle, 89.
There was, however, a complete
revolution from the principle of
these cases in Stephens 'v. Elwell,
4 S. & F., 259, founded upon the
analogy of trover to trespass. In
that case a bankrupt, being possessed of certain goods, sold them
after the act of bankruptcy to one
Dean, to be paid for by bills on
Heathcote, who had a house of
trade in London, and for whom
Dean bought goods. Heathcote
was in America, and the defendant
was his clerk and conducted the
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business of the house. The defendant was informed by Dean of
the purchase, and the goods were
afterward delivered to him. He
disposed of them by sending them
to America to Heathcote. It was
held a conversion. Lord EI.LiNBOROUGH, C. J. : "The only question is whether this is a conversion
in the clerk, which would undoubtedlybe so in the master. The clerk
acted under an unavoidable ignorance and for his master's benefit
when he sent the goods to his master, but, nevertheless, his acts may
amount to a conversion, for a person is guilty of a conversion who
intermeddles with my property and
disposes of it; and it is no answer
that he acted under the authority
of another who had himself no
authority to dispose of it." See
Branch v. White, r C. B. N. S.,
414; Davies v. Union, 6 Q. B., 443;
Edgerly v. Wayland, io6 Mass.,
307; Flaunders v. Colby, 28 N. H.,
24; Thorpe v. Berlin, ii Johns.,
285.
The severity of a rule which imposed upon an individual the absolute duty of respecting another's
rights of property was found to be
too harsh when applied to every
transaction of life. A carrier, for
instance, obliged to carry from
place to place, "or all who desired
transportation, was a quasi-public
servant, and should be absolved
from liability when ignorant of an
owner's tittle. There was no means
of knowing that a wrongdoer had
no title. An exception was, therefore, engrafted upon the rule of
Stephens v. Elwell, in those cases
where the defendant acted innocently in a public or quasi-public
capacity.
Such was the theory expressed
in the decision of Greenaway v.

Fisher, i Har. & Paine, 19o. The
distinction between this case, said
Lord TjNDERrON, and that of "a
servant, is that here there is a
public employment." Accordingly,
a packer, who prepared goods for
shipment for all who desired his
services, was exempt from liability
for packing goods at the request of
a thief.
It is intimated in the opinion of
the Court in the last case, that if
the defendant had assumed a distinct ownership of the property,
even though only temporarily, he
would be liable despite the public
nature of his business, and his
ignorance of his employer's want
of title. See Lee v. Bayes, 18 C.
B., 609.
All these conflicting theories are
reviewed in the opinion of Lord
BI, ACBURw

in the House of Lords

in the case of Hollins v. Fowler
(supra), where the idea that the
public or quasi-public nature of a
man's business is the test of his
liability, was overthrown. The
reason why a carrier who merely
ships goods from place to place is
absolved is not because of the
public nature of the carrying trade,
but because he has done nothing
which could be called an intermeddling with the plaintiff's title
within the meaning of a conversion. "I apprehend the carrier
would not be liable for merely
transferring the custody of goods
from a warehouse in Liverpool to
one at Stockport, because that is
an act which is piriia jade justifiable in any one who"has the law-•
ful custody of the goods, as a finder
or bailee, and the railroad company in the case supposed would
be in complete ignorance that
more was done. . . . The public
nature of the defendant's calling is
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strong Avidence that h4 intended
no more than to assist in the
change of custody; but that (i.e.,
the public nature of his calling) of
itself makes no difference."
Afer
d
remarking that he knew
.of no direct authority to support
.A the proposition, Lord BLACKBURN
declared that a rule which seems
* to embrace all cases and forms and
* an accurate test, is that " one who
Aeals with goods at the request of
a person who has 'the actual custody
of them in the bonafide belief that
the custodian is the true owner, is
excused for what he does if the act
is of such a nature is would be excused if done by the authority of
' the person in possession, if he was

the finder of the goods or entrusted
with their custody."
• The rule furiiished by Lord
BLACkBusN had not been distinctly
enunciated until the judgment of
Hollins v. Fowler, and it is founded
'purely upon the technical nature
of the action of trover. The finder
of goods acquired therein at cornmoi law a special property which
was lost by the turning up of the
loser. That special property had
ceitain rights iticident to it,
namely, the right to exercise all
reasonable means for the preserva-

'tion of the chattel.

The finder did

not have any power of sale nor any
right to consume the property
(Comyn's Dig., Tit. TROVER F).
The right of the finder was, therefore, one of possession, and the
possession was notice to third persons of the character of the possessor's rights. Lord BLACKBURN,
proceeds upon the theory that
since the right of the finder Was
a possessory right, any act by a
third party performed at the instance of the possessor, which the
possessor, if he were the finder,
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might reasonably execute, is excused. Thus, to transport goods at
the request of another is hot, 4rivza
facie, any assumption of dominion over the property transported,
and is an act which a finder, as
such, might reasonably undertake.
Therefore a carrier is excused.
Agreeably to the idea expressed
above, an agent or servant is not
liable who merely assists in a
wrongful transfer of title, acting
innocently in a ministerial capacity
without reference to the ownership
of the goods: Hollins v. Fowler,
L. R. H. L., 767. If B, having a
wrongful possession of A's goods,
employs a broker to sell, who sells
to C, and all the broker does is to
send bought and sold notes to B
and C, no action of trover, or any
other form of action can-be maintained against the brcker Per
BRXTT, L. J., L. R. 2 B. Q. B. 627.
Upon the same principle, a carrier who transports goods froiii
place to place; a packer who prepares goods for shipment; a watchmaker who repairs a watch and returns it to the person who left it;
the farrier who shoes a horse for a
thief; a broker who simply negotiates a contract of sale, cannot be
charged for assisting a wrongdoer
in his conversion if ignorant of the
rights of the owner: BLACKBURN,
L. J., Hollins v. Fowler, 7 H. L.,
757In Hollins v. Fowler, L. R. 7,
H. L. 757; S. C. Law, R. 7, Q. B.
627, one Bailey fraudulently -obtained cotton from Fowler, the
plaintiff; Hollins, the defendant's
broker, purchased it from Bailey in
good faith in the belief and expectation that M, one of his ordinary
clients, would accept it. M did
accept, it, but at the time Hollins
ppurchased M had not ordered or
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intimated that he desired to purchase any cotton.
Hollins only
received from M a broker's commission, and not a trade profit on
the sale. It was held that in this
instance Hollins had made himself
a principal, and by transferring the
cotton to M was guilty of a conversion, which made him liable at the
suit of Fowler, the owner of the
cotton.
Compared with the case of Hollins v. Fowler may be cited Turner
v. Hockey, 56 L. J., Q. B. 3o,
where the ostensible owner of a
cow brought it to a public market and placed it in a pen rented
by the defendant, an auctioneer,
whom he instructed to sell it. The
defendant, without notice that the
cow was not the.property of the
person instructing him, sold it, and
immediately after he received the
money paid it over to the ostensible seller, the latter having previously paid him his commissions;
Held, That the real owner could
not maintain trover against the
auctioneer, since having the cow
in one of his pens did not give the
auctioneer such possession as would
support an action.
In Cochran v. Rymell, 40 L. T.,
N. S. 744, Lord. BRAMWELL said:
"Suppose a man were to come into
an auctioneer's yard holding a
horse by the bridle and say, 'I
want to sell my horse; i f you will
find a purchaser I will pay commis-

sions.' And the auctioneer says:
'Here is a man who wants to sell a
horse; will any one buy him?' If
he then and there finds him a purchaser and the seller himself hands
over the horse, there could be no
act on the part of the auctioneer
which could render him liable for
an action of conversion."
See Hardman v. Booth, i H. &
C., 803; Perminter v. Kelly, IS
Ala., 716; Rogers v. Hine, i Cal.,
429; Pool v. Aldsisson, i Danna,
iio; Kimball v. Billings, 55 Me.,
147; Coles v. Clark, 3 Cush., 399;
Koch v. Branch, 44 MO., 542;
Everett v. Coffin, 6 Wend., 6o3 ;
Anderson v. Nicholas, 5 Bosw., 121;
Dudley v. Hawley, 4o Barb., 397;
compare Rogers v. Hine, 2 Cal.,
571; Spooner v. Holmes, 102 Mass.,
502.
The cases then seem to warrant
the following conclusion: An agent
or servant is excused for what he
does, if the act is of such a nature
as would be excused if performed
by a custodian having a lawful
possession and prima facie title
such as a finder or bailee even
though the possession of the servant or agent is wrongful, provided
the latter is ignorant of the real
ownership.
(See an article by lr. Nathan
Newmark, 14 Am. L. Rev., p. 363
upon this and kindred topics).
JoHN A. MCCARTHY.

